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This paper assesses for 28 developing countries over the period 1980-2001 whether 
the existence of a regulatory law and higher quality regulatory governance are significantly 
associated with superior electricity outcomes.  The analysis draws on theoretical and 
empirical work on the impact of independent central banks and of developing country 
telecommunications regulators.  The empirical analysis concludes that, controlling for other 
relevant variables and allowing for country specific fixed effects, a regulatory law and higher 
quality governance is positively and significantly associated with higher per capita 
generation capacity levels.  In addition, this positive impact continues to increase for at least 
three years and probably for over 10 years as experience develops and regulatory reputation 
grows.  The results are robust to alternative dynamic specifications, eg as estimates from 
alternative lag structures and for the application of an error correction model, and show no 
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Over the last 10-15 years, a very large amount of attention has been given to 
the role of institutions in economic growth. This has, in large part, been driven by 
economic policy priorities such as how to develop effectively functioning market 
economies in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union post-1989; and 
how to foster economic growth in lagging world regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa. 
In parallel, and partly in response, there have been major explorations of the role of 
institutions in the functioning of market economies both by economists (e.g. the 
literature arising out of Williamson’s transaction cost economics approach) and by 
economic historians (e.g. North (1990) and others).  
In recent years, there has also been a substantial empirical literature on the 
relative roles of institutions, policy, geography and trade openness on growth 
performance across countries. This literature currently indicates that institutional 
quality is the dominant determinant of variations in long-term growth performance
1. 
Good institutions embody a heritage of past good policy decisions and themselves 
generate a flow of superior policy decisions that support sustained investment and 
productivity growth
2. In his recent survey on growth strategies, Rodrik (2003) argues 
that, although it is quite possible to achieve short-term growth accelerations (e.g. of 
10 years or more) with very limited institutional change; the main requirement to 
ensure sustained growth and convergence with the living standards in advanced 
countries “… is the acquisition of high quality institutions”. In particular, he argues 
that there is a requirement for a “… cumulative process of institution building to 
ensure that growth does not run out of steam and that the economy remains resilient to 
shocks”
 3.  
 
                                                 
1  See Rodrik , Subramanian and Trebbi (2002) for a recent survey of the literature on studies of cross-
country growth performance. 
2  Rodrik et al (2002), pp 20-21.  
3  Rodrik (2003), p.25  
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Infrastructure industries are not just a microcosm of the aggregate economy. 
The arguments above on aggregate growth apply with extra force to utility service 
industries. This is because not just are they highly capital intensive, but, in addition, 
because most of their assets are very long-lived and (in economic terms) sunk assets. 
Hence, an effective institutional framework is essential to sustain growth in output, 
efficiency and capacity for commercialised utility service industries such as 
electricity, telecommunications, water and similar - particularly if these industries 
have significant amounts of private investment (physical and/or financial).  
The standard institutional solution is to introduce an independent regulatory 
agency, operating within a clearly defined legal framework
4. The regulatory agency is 
intended to provide the “high quality institution” which permits and fosters sustained 
growth in capacity and efficiency in the utility service industries – particularly the 
network elements. Hence, whether or not country X has a high or a low quality 
institution is determined primarily by the quality of governance of the regulatory 
agency (conditional on the governance quality for the country as a whole). As with 
the aggregate economy, developing countries with high quality regulatory agencies 
(as measured by their regulatory governance) should attract more investment on a 
sustained basis into their utility service industries and at a lower cost of capital, as 
well as having higher efficiency levels and growth rates in the regulated utilties.  
We would expect this outcome to arise because regulatory agencies with better 
governance should (a) make fewer mistakes and (b) have their mistakes identified and 
rectified better and more quickly so that (c) good regulatory practice is more readily 
established and maintained. It may well be possible to obtain a major short-to-
medium term increase in investment without an effective regulatory framework, but 
the considerations outlined above suggest that this will not be sustained long-term. 
The collapse of the Asian IPP boom of the early 1990s and the late 1990s difficulties 
                                                 
4   An independent regulatory agency is not the only way of providing the necessary institutional 
support either in theory or in practice. In addition, an independent regulator may be combined with a 
high or a low degree of reliance on contracts and courts.  
There is a major issue of whether or not low income developing countries have the human and 
other resources to sustain independent regulatory agencies, particularly regulatory agencies with a 
significant degree of discretion. Nevertheless, an independent regulatory agency has become the 
standard solution to the private investment problem for utilities in the same way as an independent 
central bank has become the standard solution to handle commitment and time inconsistency 
problems in monetary policy. See Section 2 below as well as the literature discussed in Stern and 
Cubbin (2003).  
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with many of the Latin American infrastructure reforms and concession contracts 
provide some evidence to support this conjecture.  
The perspective outlined above is at the heart of the recent literature on 
regulatory governance for utility service industries, particularly the literature that 
focuses on developing and transition economies. This perspective is set out in Levy 
and Spiller (1994) – which draws explicitly on North (1990) – as well as in a number 
of subsequent papers
5. However, until recently, there has been very little systematic 
empirical testing of the hypothesis that better regulatory governance (a) reduces 
unserved demand by encouraging investment or (b) increases efficiency. There have 
been many case studies – and these can be very illuminating but do not allow reliable 
generalisations – but, until the last 2-3 years, little formal econometric or other 
statistical testing.  
This is now changing. More developing country utility regulators have been in 
place for 5 years or more and data is now becoming available on them that can be 
related to industry outcomes on a comparable basis, most obviously for telecoms. 
Hence, there have been a number of studies of the impact of a regulatory agency on 
capacity growth and efficiency in telecoms. All the major recent studies show that 
having a regulatory agency is significantly associated, either directly or indirectly, 
with higher mainline capacity per capita and higher labour productivity.  
In this paper, we carry out a similar exercise for electricity supply industries in 
developing countries. Specifically, we provide an econometric analysis of the 
relationship between the quality of regulatory governance and (a) the level of 
generation capacity per capita and (b) some efficiency measures for a sample of 28 
Latin American, Caribbean, Asian and African countries over the period 1980-2001. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the underlying 
economic issues and the main institutional design considerations. This includes a 
summary review of recent relevant literature and its relevance for our analysis. In 
Section 3, we set out our modelling approach, including the modelling objectives, our 
econometric approach, data issues and potential econometric concerns. Section 4 
presents the estimation results. Section 5 discusses the results and their implications 
as well as providing some short concluding comments. 
                                                 
5  See, inter alia, Smith (1997), Stern and Holder (1999), Noll (2001).   
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2. Underlying Economic Issues, Institutional Design and Implications for 
Empirical Analysis 
 
The main issue on which we focus is the inability of governments to make 
credible and binding commitments about utility pricing to sustain private investment 
while retaining decision-making powers over these issues.  
The discussion of utility service regulation concentrates on commercialised 
utilities facing genuine budget constraints, particularly where private investment 
and/or private finance is important. The focus of the discussion (and of our empirical 
work) is on regulatory governance (e.g. autonomy, accountability, etc) rather than on 




2.1. Time Inconsistency Problems and Utility Service Industry Investment  
The underlying economic issue for utility regulation – as for monetary policy 
– is that governments, particularly at certain times, have a strong incentive to behave 
in a shortsighted and populist manner that reduces welfare summed over a medium to 
long-term period. Hence, both in general but particularly at times of pressure, they 
place a very high weight on retail electricity prices over the next year relative to the 
medium to long term. In consequence, in the utilities industry context, authoritarian 
governments facing serious protests (and democratic governments facing difficulties 
in imminent elections) have a strong incentive to hold down electricity prices below 
economic cost even if this jeopardises future investment and consumption.  
For utility service industries, long-term contracts without a regulatory agency 
may be sufficient in some circumstances to provide the necessary institutional surety 
(e.g. for toll roads, water and sewage and similar). However, a regulatory agency may 
well help improve the sustainability of contracts even in those industries
7. For 
electricity, although contracts may play a large part, they do not seem to be able to 
                                                 
6  We looked, in passing, at methods of price/profits regulation in our empirical work but this issue was 
a subsidiary concern for this paper. See Section 4 for the results. 
7  See Guasch, J.L., Laffont, J.J. & Straub, S., (2003) for a discussion of renegotiation of water and 
transport concession contracts in Latin America.  
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substitute for regulation in providing a sound basis for private investment in 
generation, let alone in transmission and distribution
8.  
In consequence, we assume in what follows that an independent regulatory 
agency is the first-best method of ensuring that private investment in the electricity 
and similar industries can be sustained and at the lowest possible cost of capital. 
Similarly, an independent regulatory agency seems to be the best way of providing 
effective but reasonable incentives for efficiency and high productivity – and strong 
growth in these. The question then is what are the appropriate measures of governance 
to ensure the effectiveness of the regulatory agency in terms of these objectives. 
The answers to these are typically given as a combination of:  
 
1)  some formal legal requirements both (a) to underpin the regulatory agency 
and (b) to set out the powers and duties of the regulatory agency; and 




In the empirical work that we discuss below, our measures of regulatory 




2.2. Output Measures for Utility Regulatory Agencies 
For utility service industries, there is a major issue in defining appropriate 
output measures for utility regulation. For all countries, rich and poor, a relevant 
output is higher levels of (and faster growing) technical and efficiency as well as 
quality of service. However, whereas virtually all developing countries need 
significant increases in capacity to meet demand – at least in electricity supply, the 
same is by no means always true for rich countries. One of the main drivers of the 
liberalisation plus privatisation plus independent regulation OECD electricity reform 
                                                 
8  See Stern (2003) for a discussion of these issues in the context of the development of the UK 
electricity industry pre-1940. 
9  See among others Levy and Spiller (1994), Smith (1997), Stern and Holder (1999), Noll (2001). For 
a full discussion, see Stern and Cubbin (2003). 




model has been the desire to reduce unnecessarily high capacity reserve margins as 
well as to reduce investment costs.  
This issue is important since significantly higher investment (and private 
investment) was the single most important reason cited over the last 15 years by the 
World Bank and similar policy institutions for the promotion of independent 
regulatory agencies in electricity and similar utility service industries
11. This view 
goes back to the underlying time-inconsistency problem and the question of how, 
given limited tax resources, developing countries can increase capacity and reduced 
unserved demand – particularly for countries with poor reputations as regards their 
treatment of private investment. Hence, an independent regulatory agency has been 
advocated as the way in which private investors can be assured that they will be able 
to earn a reasonable rate of return.  
In consequence, on this hypothesis, it is to be expected that sizeable increases 
in private investment flows (domestic and foreign) will arise in developing country 
electricity and similar industries following the establishment of an independent 
regulatory agency.  
It is, however, worth noting that the speed at which the regulatory credibility 
is established is very unclear. It is likely to take some time, so that one might well 
expect lags of some years between the establishment of the new regulatory agencies 
and any significant increase in investment. 
The implications of the above are that, in estimating the impact of regulatory 
governance variables on outcomes, we concentrate on: 
 
1)  Electricity capacity levels in developing countries, excluding transition 
economies as well as OECD countries; and 
2)  Efficiency measures in developing countries, insofar as they are available.  
 
We discuss the precise statistical measures of these in the next section. 
However, the key point to note here is that we have chosen our sample so that it 
includes only countries where there is good reason to believe that there are significant 
amounts of unsatisfied electricity demand because of capacity constraints.  
                                                 
11 The World Bank’s 1994 World Development Report “Infrastructure for Development” is a good 
example. See Chapter 3.  
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2.3. Results from Studies of Regulation on Developing Country 
Telecommunications Outcomes 
The approach outlined above is echoed in a rapidly growing literature on the 
impact of regulation on telecom outcomes.  
The main empirical papers in this area (e.g. Fink, Mattoo and Rathindran 
(2003), Wallsten (2002) and Gutierrez (2003)) estimate the effects of regulation on  
 
1)  mainline penetration rates (a standard measure of capacity) and  
2)  efficiency (e.g. mainlines per employee).  
 
They typically estimate panel data models (primarily fixed effects models) 
with one or other of the outcome measures as the dependent variable, and include 
regulatory variables as independent variables along with competition and privatisation 
variables, as well as standard control variables. We follow this approach in estimating 
the impact of regulation on electricity industry outcomes.  
The standard model estimated in these papers (e.g. by Gutierrez) is  
   
Yit = Xitβ + Ditδ + αi + εit,  i =1, …, N; j = 1, …, T      (Equ 1) 
 
where X is a vector of exogenous variables,  
D is a vector of dummy variables,  
αi is a country specific fixed effect and  
εit, is an error model.  
 
The X vector includes both regulatory variables and standard control variables  
The approach of Gutierrez (2003) is particularly relevant to this paper. He 
constructs a regulatory governance index for his sample of 22 Latin American and 
Caribbean countries. This 7-element index (derived from the Stern-Holder typology) 
is calculated from examination of each country’s telecom laws and changes in the 
laws. In our model for electricity outcomes, we adopt a similar approach and use a 
‘snapshot’ 4-element index for 2000. (See Section 4 below for further details of our 
index and the data.)  
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Gutierrez (2003) finds statistically and positive direct effects of his regulatory 
index both on tele-density and on efficiency. This result occurs both in static and 
dynamic models and after testing for the endogeneity of regulation
12. The estimated 
effect of a 1-point increase in the index on mainlines per 100 inhabitants varies 
somewhat depending on the precise model specification but is, in general, of the order 
of 20%. 
The Gutierrez study and its estimates provide a useful benchmark for our 




2.4. Results from Studies of Regulation on Developing Country Electricity 
Industry Outcomes 
As yet, there are only a very few and very preliminary empirical studies e.g. 
Zhang, Kirkpatrick and Parker (2002) and a part of Pargal (2003). For data 
availability reasons, the capacity variable for these studies is generation capacity 
only. This is measured in physical units (ie in Gigawatts) Data on this is available on 
an annual basis from the US Department of Energy’s EIA website for almost all 
countries from 1980. Unfortunately, there is nothing similar available for capacity in 
transmission or distribution
14.  
These papers find only weak effects of regulation, if any, and there are major 
problems in disentangling the effects of regulation from those of liberalisation. 
However, the studies are much more preliminary than those for telecoms, particularly 
in data terms.  
In this paper, we have had access to much better data on regulatory 
governance and its variation across countries. However, our estimation of models for 
capacity, like those of Zhang et al and Pargal, is also limited to generation capacity.
                                                 
 
13 See Stern and Cubbin op cit, p. 38-43 for further details of these studies 
14 Pargal uses the Calderon –Serven infrastructure investment data set for 9 Latin American countries 
1980-98. This divides electricity investment into public and private but appears, again, only to cover 
generation. See Calderon and Serven (2002) for a description of these data.   
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3. Model Specification and Modelling Issues 
 
Our modelling work is primarily concerned with whether better regulatory 
governance in developing countries: 
 
1)  increases rated generation capacity per capita; and 
2)  increases efficiency e.g. by increasing capacity utilisation in generation 
and/or reducing transmission and distribution losses. 
 
3.1. Underlying Economic Rationale 
On capacity, we start from the basis that developing countries have serious 
capacity constraints which lead to significant unserved demand arising, among other 
reasons. from many years of low levels of investment. In developing countries, it has 
typically been the case that electricity supplies were inadequate and intermittent. 
Supply was insufficient to cope with the level of demand as a result of a variety of 
interconnected factors. 
Rectifying the issue of inadequate levels of capacity and investment has been a 
major policy objective and a justification for electricity sector reform shared by 
developing country governments and development agencies, national and 
international, including the World Bank and the international regional banks. 
The World Bank and others have argued that the establishment of good 
regulatory governance (e.g. via the development of well-founded independent 
regulatory agencies) has been a key element in their reform strategy over the last 15 
or more years. Hence, estimating whether regulatory agencies have significant 
impacts on electricity capacity levels over time is important for the effectiveness of 
the policy. This also provides a test of the theoretical case for the importance of time 
inconsistency arguments as a useful framework for considering investment in the 
electricity industry. 
Of course, inadequate supply levels are not due just to inadequate investment. 
In many developing countries, rated capacity has been much higher than available 
capacity. However, the same factors (e.g. revenue shortages and inadequate returns) 
also lead to low levels of maintenance. This is a major reason for expecting that  
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improvements in regulatory governance will increase efficiency and raise capacity 
utilisation rates. 
 
3.1.1. Regulation and Capacity Levels 
The effect of electricity reform and the introduction of explicit regulation is to 
focus the policy of the electricity industry on providing sufficient supplies.   
In some cases, this has been done by harnessing the forces of private 
ownership and/or competition. In others, it has to provide a workable financial 
framework within which the electricity industry could develop by loosening the ties 
with government – for example, by enacting an electricity law giving various powers 
and duties to a Ministry regulator thereby requiring publicly owned electricity 
companies to operate in a more commercial way which would, among other things, 
allow state owned electricity companies to borrow from banks or debt markets on 
standard, commercial terms. 
Investment is encouraged once effective regulation is available to support a 
workable financial framework. If the electricity industry is in private ownership the 
owners have the prospect of earning a reasonable return on their investment; if 
publicly owned, the industry can become independent of tax revenue or continually 
increasing loans. In addition, the existence of an effective regulatory framework can 
also encourage the growth of private investment and/or private finance within state 
systems, as has been happening in recent years in India and China.  
These considerations suggest that the presence of an effective regulatory 
framework should, in general, lead to increased investment in the electricity sector, 
including the balanced development of generation, transmission, and distribution 
ceteris paribus. Unfortunately, comparable time-series capacity data across countries 
only exists for generation and it is on this aspect that the present study focuses. 
  In an unconstrained market economy, per capita generation capacity will 
adjust to the level of demand, which will depend upon the level of per capita income, 
the price of electricity, and environmental factors such as climate. The price of 
electricity will be determined in part by the efficiency of the sector. The latter may 
depend upon regulatory factors, but also availability of energy sources such as hydro, 
gas, oil, and coal. (This is most evident in cross-US comparisons of prices.) However, 
many developing countries with a traditional, vertically integrated and state-owned  
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electricity sector will be constrained not so much by market demand but by the 
availability of continuing subsidy. 
The capacity constraints arise because of either inadequate government 
revenues for electricity investment or subsidy payments and/or insufficient revenue 
flow to support viable private investment. A simple diagrammatic version of such a 
model is shown in Figure 1 below 
 
Figure  1  Chronic Supply Constrained Electricity Shortage (loss making 
public enterprise) 
 
In this model, the level of capacity in the unreformed industry depends on the 
sum of private and public expenditure on investment in electricity which, in turn, will 
be determined primarily by the level of national income per capita. It is also well-
established that the demand for electricity (and hence for electricity capacity) has an 
elasticity close to 1 with respect to GDP.  Hence, we would expect equilibrium 
electricity demand and supply for electricity to be related to GDP growth.   
For both these reasons, we include per capita GDP in our model, with an 
expected long-run elasticity not significantly different from 1. We also consider other 
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the share of industry in value added, country debt levels and country economy-wide 
governance indicators.  
The effect of an effective regulatory framework should be to reduce the 
constraint on the operation of the market, increasing supply and moving the outcome 
closer to the market equilibrium. The better the governance of the regulator, the 
greater the expected increase in capacity and increase in electricity supply. 
We measure the quality of governance primarily by an index of regulatory 
governance which has 4 elements: 
 
1)  Whether the country has an electricity or (energy) regulatory law; 
2)  Whether the country has an autonomous or a Ministry regulator for 
electricity; 
3)  Whether the country’s electricity regulator is funded from licence fees (or 
equivalent) or out of the government budget; and 
4)  Whether the staff in the electricity regulator can be paid as appropriate 
given skill needs and labour markets or whether staff have to be paid on 
civil service pay scales. 
 
These are all measured by 0/1 dummies. The highest governance ranking (a 
score of 4 on the index) is represented by having enacted an electricity regulatory law, 
plus an autonomous regulator, plus funding from licence fees and the staff not being 
confined to civil service pay scales. The dating of the switch from 0 to 1 on the 
appropriate variables (subsequently maintained at a constant level) is derived from the 
date of enactment of the law (except for cases where other information was available 
to provide a known, superior alternative). Hence, we can investigate the effect of age 
of the regulatory agency as well as its existence.  
Given the economic arguments set out above and in Section 2, we would 
expect the coefficients on the index and on each of its components to be positive. We 
might also expect the effect of regulation to increase with the age of the regulator, 
particularly for the first few years. 
In terms of the typology in Section 2.2, the regulatory variables in our index 
are all measures of formal attributes of regulation. Unfortunately, no comparable data 
is currently available on the informal, practical qualities of electricity regulation and  
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the necessary omission of data on these characteristics must be borne in mind when 
considering the results, including potential biases to the estimates and to estimated 
standard errors. In addition, unlike Gutierrez (2003), we have no time dimension on 
changes in formal governance attributes subsequent to the enactment of the 
electricity/energy regulatory law. 
These considerations suggest a capacity model of the following form: 
 
Log(ELCAPPC)it = (a0  + ai) + a1 log(GDPPC)it + a2  Industryit  + a3  Debtit  + a4 
RegIndexit + a5 Xit + vi t          (2) 
 
Where Log ELCAPPC is the log of per capita electricity generation capacity in 
Gigawatts; 
a0 is a constant term;  
ai is a time-invariant country specific fixed effect 
GDPPC is real per capita national income in $US 1995
15; 
Industry is the log of industry value added as a percentage of GDP; 
Debt is the share of government debt service as a percentage of gross national income; 
RegIndex is our regulatory governance index (or individual components of it); 
X is a vector of other potentially relevant variables (e.g. rule of law and corruption 
measures, age of regulatory agency, method of price regulation, etc); and  
uit is an error term 
 
In all cases, the variables exist for i = 1, …, I countries over t = 1, …., T time periods.  
The regulatory index takes the value of 0,1, 2, 3 or 4 where zero is ascribed to 
countries with a Ministry regulator, no electricity regulatory law, government budget 
funding and civil service pay scales.  
The X vector for this equation might well include domestic fuel/hydro source 
availability and a variety of other country specific economic and/or institutional 
variables. However, these variables can be expected to stay fairly constant over the 
period of estimation - as do country governance rankings. 
Following the literature on the impact of telecom reform in developing 
countries, we also explore the role of (i) privatisation and (ii) competition on 
                                                 
15 Hence, GDP is on an exchange rate rather than a PPP basis.  
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generation capacity growth. We investigate both direct and indirect effects (e.g. 
interactions between these variables and the regulatory index). 
Although we start by estimating an OLS version of the model above, most of 
the results reported in Section 4 are for a fixed effects model
16. Differencing the 
equation above eliminates the constant term and the country-specific fixed effects. If 
fixed effects are significant, the error term the equation above will not be normally 
distributed with zero mean when estimated by OLS. (See Section 3.2.2 below for a 
fuller discussion of econometric issues.)  
The fixed effects are likely to include country variables with little or no time 
variation over the sample period. This affects not just fuel source availability, but also 
many constant or slowly changing institutional variables. The estimated fixed effects 
may therefore capture key aspects of the rule of law and corruption as country 
rankings on these indicators tend to be relatively stable over 10-20 year periods. 
The equation above is a static  representation of the model, which provide 
evidence on long-run equilibrium effects. We also consider:  
 
1)  dynamic variants e.g. incorporating a lagged dependent variable as in 
Gutierrez (2003); and  
2)  error correction models which allow for more explicit examination of 
long-run equilibrium effects as opposed to short-run adjustment effects 
3)  IV (instrumental variable)models that control for the potential endogeneity 
of our regulatory governance index.  
 
3.1.2. Regulation and Efficiency 
As regards efficiency, we concentrated on the impact of regulation on two 
readily measurable characteristics of electricity supply industries for which 
comparable time-series data existed: 
 
1)  Utilisation of generation capacity; and 
2)  Technical losses in transmission and distribution. 
 
The first was measured as:  
                                                 
16 See Section 3.3.2.1 below for a fuller discussion of heterogeneity issues.  
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(Total Annual Generation in TWh)/(Generation Capacity in TW/365 * 24) 
 
This measure provides a good proxy for the availability of generation plant. Many 
developing countries have rated capacity levels that are considerably higher than 
available capacity and higher utilisation rates should closely reflect improvements in 
availability e.g. from the impact of better regulatory governance on maintenance 
expenditure. 
Technical losses were measured as transmission and distribution losses as a 
percentage of total generation. 
In both cases, we deliberately estimated a simple and parsimonious fixed 
effects model with the regulatory index as the main explanatory variable and real per 
capita GDP as a control variable. This was, not least, because there was no obvious 
well-defined theoretical model on which to base a more sophisticated approach. 
We would very much have liked to estimate models for quality of supply (e.g. 
supply interruptions, coverage of system) and also for commercial losses. Empirical 
studies of electricity reform have shown that a major impact has been to improve 
quality and to reduce non-technical losses, particularly at the distribution level
17. 
Unfortunately, no data currently exists for these variables that would allow the 
estimation of cross-country panel data models to test for the impact of improved 
regulation on quality. 
 
3.2. Modelling Approach 
The purpose of the investigation was: 
  
1)  to undertake a preliminary analysis for the electricity industry of the effect 
of independent regulators and aspects of their governance on improving 
the overall performance of the sector; and 
2)  to identify priority areas where enhanced data was required to allow a 
better analysis of these effects. 
 
Under a), the key questions we have tried to answer are: 
 
                                                 
17 See, for instance, Bacon and Besant-Jones (2001)  
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1)  Does the existence of an independent regulator appear to have any effects 
on measurable aspects of electricity industry performance (generation 
capacity, utilisation and technical losses)? 
2)  If so, how big is the effect? 
3)  By how much is the size of any effect influenced by measurable aspects of 
the governance of the regulatory institutions? 
4)  What effects do private ownership and competition have in enhancing the 
aspects of performance we have measured, independently and in 
combination with regulation? 
 
Unfortunately, data limitations prevented us from seriously addressing the impacts of 
privatisation and competition
18.  
On b), the quality and precision of the answers to these questions should help 
us to identify priorities for improvements on currently measured data. Consideration 
of the potential impact on the results of omitted variables and the resulting potential 
biases should help identify priorities for collecting data on variables for which data is 
not currently available. 
 
3.2.1. Data  
We have collected data on 28 developing countries over a 21 year period 
(1980-2001). Of the 28 countries in the sample, 15 were in Latin America, 6 in the 
Caribbean, 4 were in Asia and 5 were in Africa. The list of countries includes large 
countries (e.g. Brazil and India), small countries (e.g. Jamaica); middle income 
countries (e.g. Chile and Mexico) and poor countries (e.g. Ethiopia and Sudan). The 
full list of countries for which we have data is in the Appendix.  
Although much of the regulatory activity took place in the last half of the data 
set, the earlier period is important in effectively establishing benchmark levels of the 
dependent variables, and also in reducing some of the biases that can potentially arise 
in the use of short panels.  In fact, 20.7% of the total number of country-sample years 
were years with an autonomous regulator and 31% with an electricity or energy 
regulatory law. 
The key data sources used are:  
                                                 
18 See Section 5.1.2.2 below.  
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•  US Energy Information Agency – for data on generation capacity by 
country (GW) 1980-2001 (Noted that the EIA series does not distinguish 
between publicly and privately owned generation capacity.) 
•  World Bank Development Indicators - for Per capita GDP in $US1995; 
electric power transmission and distribution losses and other control 
variables  
•  The Preetum Domah 2001 survey of electricity regulators for data on 
electricity regulatory governance, privatisation and competition 
(supplemented by the authors’ own research).
19 
 
The Domah survey data (covering 50 developed, transition and developing 
countries) are the best data currently available to estimate the impact electricity 
regulators, not least because it allows the dating of regulatory reforms, primarily 
because it records the year in which key regulatory legislation was enacted. 
The Domah data set is very suitable for a preliminary investigation of the 
impact of regulation but is far from ideal. In particular, it suffers from the following: 
 
1)  The data on electricity market structure is relatively weak and the data on 
privatisation very limited;  
2)  There is no data on the informal, practical aspects of regulation (e.g. 
security of tenure of regulatory agency heads or commissioners, etc); 
3)  The data on regulatory governance, competition and privatisation has no 
time dimension beyond a simple 0/1 dichotomy set at the year in which 
key regulatory legislation was enacted;  
4)  The data on the formal aspects of regulation only allows for a 4-element 
index rather than a larger index. These data weaknesses should be born in 
mind when considering the econometric results.  
 
3.2.2. Econometric Issues 
Panel data generally allow major opportunities for carrying out investigations 
that are not possible with single-year cross sections or single-country time series, but 
                                                 
19 See Domah, Pollitt, and Stern (2002) for full details. We are very grateful to Preetum Domah for 
permission to use the information from his survey in this paper.  
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these give rise to a number of issues which need taking into account for estimation. In 
our case, with data on 28 countries for 21 years, we have a large and long panel. 
Because of missing observations, it is an unbalanced panel. 
The use of panel data may have many benefits but their use also raises a 
number of potential econometric problems including: 
 
1)  Coefficient heterogeneity across countries.  
 
We have strong prior views that countries will differ consistently in their 
intercepts according to persisting, largely time invariant local factors.  For this reason 
our maintained hypothesis is that a fixed effects model is more appropriate than a 
random effects approach. In addition, the fixed effects static model avoids the 
potential biases which could arise in the random effects model owing to correlation 
between the included exogenous variables and omitted country attributes.  
 
2)  Dynamic structure 
 
Static models, which assume that all adjustment to disequilibrium occur within 
the period defined by observation frequency may be inappropriate. In particular, 
investment in electricity is not usually completed in a year so we would expect that 
scope for some adjustment process would need to be incorporated into our model. 
Such processes can be modelled generally by a combination of lags on the dependent 
variable (autoregressive) and on the explanatory variables (moving average).  
However, the presence of a lagged dependent variable in a fixed-effects model 
can result in a biased estimates for the lagged dependent variable coefficient. The size 
of the bias will depend on the number of time series, N, the length of the time series, 
T,  and the influence of other exogenous variables in the determination of the 
dependent variable.
20 The problem is mainly significant in short panels.  For T=21 we 
have estimated the asymptotic bias (as N increases) to be of the order of 3%. This is 
an upper limit given the presence of other major influences on the dependent variable. 
There is also the potential problem of spurious correlation eg if both electricity 
capacity and GDP per capita were both strongly trended across our countries. In fact, 
                                                 
20 See Hsiao (1986)   
 
19
they are not in our data set, but we have considered carefully how the dynamics 
should be modelled and we report a selection of the key results. 
  
3)  Endogeneity and Causality 
 
There has been much discussion of the need to take account of the 
endogeneity of regulatory agencies. This has been a major theme in the ICB literature 
where the introduction of an ICB (particularly the early introduction) may be 
interpreted as a signal of strong commitment to anti-inflation policies. Similarly, the 
early introduction of an autonomous regulator may also be a signal of a strong 
commitment to commercialisation and the enforcement of property rights
21.  
Given the relatively time-invariant rankings of countries’ governance 
(including rule of law, corruption, etc), it is not clear that there exists a particularly 
serious endogeneity problem – to the extent that there is an overall issue, it should be 
well-handled by country specific fixed effects. In addition, as noted by Fink et al 
(2002) and others, it is also extremely difficult to find appropriate instruments for 
regulatory governance variables. Nevertheless, we do in Section 5.2.4.1 explicitly 
consider endogeneity and report IV (instrumental variable) estimates that attempt to 
control for it within a fixed effects modelling framework.  
Discussion of endogeneity issues in institutional models frequently reflects 
concerns over causality rather than endogeneity per se. With a long panel of 21 years, 
fixed effects should adequately control for country-specific institutional quality 
variations so that any bias in the estimates of regulatory governance impact from that 
source hould be small. However, even if that were so, there remains the question of 
whether the estimated coefficients on regulatory governance can be taken as estimates 
of what would happen if countries were to improve or reduce the quality of 
governance of their existing regulatory institutions - or, more importantly, regulatory 
institutions of given quality were to be introduced into a country currently without 
such institutions. These, particularly the latter are the key policy questions. 
We discuss both issues in Section 5.2.4
22. 
 
                                                 
21 See Gual and Trillas (2002) 
22 We are grateful to Richard Gilbert and Jean-Michel Glachant for helpful discussions on these issues.  
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4. Descriptive Statistics 
 
In this section, we report some key descriptive statistics from the Domah 
survey. 
 
4.1. Countries with Autonomous Electricity Regulators 
Table 1 shows that by 1998 just under half the countries in our sample had an 
autonomous electricity regulator
23 – mainly in Latin America. However, in the 
following three years 3 African and 1 Caribbean country joined the set. Asia provides 
an exception to the spread of autonomous regulators with only 1 country (Philippines) 
having an autonomous regulator before 2001.  
By 2001, a majority of countries had regulators classified (at least in legal 
terms) as autonomous. 
 
Table 1: The Trend towards Autonomous Regulators (by Continent) 
 
                 1998 
 
          2001 
   Total Ministry  Autonomous Ministry  Autonomous
Africa  5 5  0  3  2 
Asia  4 3  1  3  1 
Carrib  6 3  3  2  4 
Latin America   13 4  9  4  9  
Total  28 15  13  11  17 
Source: Domah 2001 survey, supplemented and updated by authors 
 
4.2. Countries with Electricity Regulatory Laws 
Even where there was no autonomous regulator, laws for the reform of the ESI 
Including regulatory reform were being passed. Table 2 shows the regional 
distribution of electricity reform laws for those states without autonomous regulation. 
According to the Domah data, all the countries with autonomous regulators had 
enacted an electricity regulatory law. By the end of our sample period only two 
countries in the sample (Barbados and Indonesia) did not have any electricity 
regulatory law in place.   
                                                 
23 The Domah questionnaire used the term “autonomous” rather than “independent”, not least because 
it is more neutral. We treat the two terms as synonymous.  
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These laws sometimes provided for IPPs or other elements of market reform, 
for commercialisation and sometimes for unbundling and competition in generation 
and supply
24. If the laws covered regulation, they typically specified the powers and 
duties of the Ministry (or designated Ministry agency/department) in carrying out 
regulatory functions.  
 
Table 2: Non-Autonomous Regulators: Existence of Law 
 
      1998 
 
2001 
   Total Law No  Law Law No  Law 
Africa  5  0 5 3 0 
Asia  4  1 2 2 1 
Carrib  6  1 2 1 1 
Latin America  13  3 1 4 0 
Total  28 5  9  10  2 
Source: Domah 2001 survey, supplemented and updated by authors 
 
 
4.3. Age Distribution of Autonomous Regulatory Agencies 
Figure 2 shows the age distribution of energy regulatory agencies.  
                                                 
24 However, the actual introduction of competition and/or privatisation took place at some later date, 
typically with several events at different times. This is why we cannot within this data set obtain 
good indicators for privatisation and competition.  
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Figure 2: Age Distribution Of Autonomous Electricity Regulators 
























Source: Domah 2001 survey, supplemented and updated by authors 
 
Figure 2 shows clearly how many of the DTE regulatory agencies in our 
sample were very recently established. 8 (47%) were under 3-years old in 2001, 
including all the African electricity regulators. The median age was just under 5 years. 
However, 5 (29%) were 10 years old or more and accounts for 42% of the total 
number of sample years with an autonomous regulator. The over 13 year-old group of 
autonomous electricity regulatory agencies comprises Costa Rica, Philippines and 
Trinidad and Tobago.  
 
4.4. Ministry or Autonomous Regulator and Per Capita GDP 
Figure 3 shows, very interestingly, that – at least within this sample - there is 
little relationship between the existence of an autonomous regulator and per capita  
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GDP. Both autonomous and Ministry regulators are scattered through the income 
range. 
The mean income for countries with an autonomous electricity regulator was 
$3,500. For those with a ministry regulator it was $3,300. The difference was not 
significant. However, low income countries with an autonomous regulator have 
younger regulators e.g.. the two Sub-Saharan African regulators established since 
1998 (Kenya and Uganda). 
 
Figure 3:  Type of Regulator and Per Capita Income (in Real $ 1995)
25 
 
















































Source: Domah 2001 survey, supplemented and updated by authors 
 
4.1.6. Generation Capacity Utilisation 1980 and 2000 
Beginning and end-of-period generation capacity utilisation rates are shown in 
Figure 4 below. In general, there has been a noticeable increase in capacity utilisation, 
but there are country exceptions (e.g. Colombia). 
 
 
                                                 
25 For a visual depiction of the generation capacity and GDP data, see the Data Appendix in Cubbin 




Figure 4: Utilisation of Generation Capacity 1980 and 2000 










































4.5. Correlation between Indicators of Regulatory Governance 
As discussed above, our regulatory index includes 4 indicators. These are 
classified positively for: (i) the enactment of an electricity regulatory law; (ii) the 
existence of an independent/autonomous regulator; (iii) funding from licence fees (or 
equivalent) and (v) staff salaries not necessarily confined to civil service pay scales. 
Although the majority of our results are based on the index, we also try to 
estimate their separate effects. However, the degree to which we are able to do so 
depends on the levels to which they are correlated with one another. Not surprisingly, 
they are highly inter-correlated as shown in Table 3 below.  
 
Table 3: Correlation Matrix between Regulatory Governance Variables 
   ElAct  Funding Orgtype Cserv 
ElAct 1      
Funding 0.848968 1    
Orgtype 0.783066 0.703489 1  
Cserv 0.783066 0.551221 0.442631 1 
 







5. Econometric Results  
 
In what follows, we report various results. In Table 4 below, we report the 
core results for our static model of per capita generation capacity. Table 5 reports 
some results from simple LDV dynamic models of generation capacity. Table 6 
reports the results from more sophisticated error correction dynamic models and 
Table 7 reports some results for generation capacity utilisation and technical losses. 
 
5.1. Econometric Results for Models of Generation Capacity and Investment 
We start by reporting the results of an OLS equation as a baseline.  All 
subsequent equations are modelled using a fixed effects estimator.  
Given the nature of the underlying model, we would expect a fixed effects 
model to be more appropriate than a random effects model. For some of the equations, 
we tested this assumption using the Hausman test and the random effects model was 
consistently rejected in favour of a fixed effects model. 
 
5.1.1. Basic Static Generation Capacity Model Results 
The key results are shown in Table 4: 
 
•  The fixed effects model clearly dominates the OLS model as shown in the 
standard error of estimate for the regressions.  
•  The estimated coefficient on the regulatory index is significantly different 
from zero at the 1% level in Equations 1 and 2.  
•  The implications of Equation 2 (our basic fixed effects model) is that, in 
the long-run, each unit increase in the regulatory governance index is 
associated with 4.3% higher per capita generation capacity. Hence, a 
country with best regulatory governance practice and an index score of 4 
could expect to have 17.2% higher generation capacity per capita in the 
long run. 
•  The impact of regulation clearly increases with age of regulator. Equation 
3 suggests a long-run effect of regulators (Ministry or autonomous) aged 
over 3 years of 35% on per capita generation capacity. Equation 4, which  
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assumes a quadratic effect of age of regulator, implies that the impact of 
having a regulator peaks at 15 years.
26 
•  The coefficient estimates for log(real GDP) are 0.7 - 0.8, with t-values of 8 
or more. 
•  Neither the debt nor the industry value added variables were significant at 
the 5% level except in the OLS equation – a result consistently replicated.  
•  The equations all have very low Durbin-Watson statistics which suggest 
that t-values may be upward biased. (We explore this further in Section 























                                                 
26 The implicit decline in effectiveness after 15 years is not well-founded as only one of our regulatory 
agencies (Costa Rica) has a regulator in place for more than 15 years   
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Table 4: Static Models for Generation Capacity 
Dependent Variable 
= Log(Electricity Generation 









in age of 
regulator 
Explanatory 
variables  1 2 3  4 
Constant -8.286    
 (-
52.162)    
Real GDP per 
capita (log) 
0.772 0.805 0.697 0.699
 (31.071) (9.970) (8.343)  (8.522)
Debt payments as a 









 (0.838) (0.556) (-0.104)  (0.244)
Industry value 
added as proportion of GDP 
0.024 -0.002 0.000 0.001
 (7.981) (-0.607) (-0.003)  (0.232)
Index of regulatory 
governance 0-4 
0.056 0.043 -0.026 -0.011
 (2.982) (3.444) (-1.067)  (-0.638)
Regulator under 1 
year 
0.090 
    (1.465) 
Regulator 1-3 years    0.187 
    (2.398) 
Regulator aged 
over 3 years   
0.353 
    (4.370) 
Age of regulator     0.055
     (4.132)
(Age of regulator)
2     -0.002
    (-2.635)
    







Adjusted R-squared  0.764 0.952 0.954 0.954
S.E. of regression  0.605 0.272 0.267 0.266
F-statistic 465.943 372.079 352.169  365.770
Durbin-Watson  0.043 0.161 0.163 0.153
No of observations  577 577 577   
Note: t statistics in 







5.1.2. Variants on the Fixed Effects Generation Capacity Model   
A large number of variants, static and dynamic, are reported in full in Cubbin 
and Stern (2004). Here, we summarise the key results. 
5.1.2.1. Static Model: Individual Governance Elements 
The first set of variants was the estimation of the static model of per capita 
generation capacity, as in Table 4 above, but including in 4 separate equations each of 
the individual governance elements in our regulatory index. The main results were as 
follows: 
 
•  The largest estimated regulatory effect of the index components was, 
perhaps surprisingly, from having an electricity law (18% with a t-value of 
5.1) rather than from having an autonomous regulator (10% with a t-value 
of 2.3). However, these must be interpreted in the light of the correlation 
between them of 0.78. 
•  Licence funding of the regulator also had a positive estimated effect 
(13.5% with a t-value of 3.4) 
•  The estimated sign on non-mandatory civil service pay scales was negative 
(and significant at the 1% level) ie the opposite of that predicted by 
regulatory governance theory.  
•  The strong effect of a regulatory law – and of age of regulator variables 
derived from the date of the law – appears to reflect a signalling and 
commitment effect from having a legal framework which makes even 
Ministry regulators significantly more accountable for how they carry out 
their functions. It may be that the effect of an autonomous regulator would 
be higher in a sample where more autonomous regulators had been in 
operation for more than 5 years.  
 
Given the high degree of collinearity between the regulatory variables, we 
used principal components to help better identify the effects of the individual 
governance elements. We first computed the principal components of the four 
governance element. We then included the first 2 principal components (accounting 
for over 90% of the total index variance) in a static fixed effects regression of per 
capita generation capacity with per capita GDP as the other explanatory variable. The  
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estimated impact of each of the 2 principal components was positive but only the 
coefficient estimate of the first principal component was statistically significant at the 
5% level, with a t-value of 3.8.
27 
Interestingly, the loadings of the individual components in the first principal 
component (accounting for 76% of the total index variance) were broadly similar. 
Nevertheless, the loading from the electricity law element was the highest, providing 
some corroboration for the results and the associated conjectures above arising from 
the separate equations for the individual governance elements. 
 
5.1.2.2. Static Model: Privatisation and Competition 
The equations estimated showed no statistically significant effect of either of 
these on generation capacity. However, the privatisation dummy available to us is 
deficient on dating – privatisation of electricity industry segments is a process which 
frequently takes several years. This is not captured by our dummy. In addition, our 
competition dummy is a weak proxy based on the total number of firms in segments 
of the industry as well as poor on dating.  
The coefficient on our competition proxy variable was consistently negative 
but not significantly different from zero.  
The coefficient on the privatisation variable was only significant at the 10% 




5.1.2.3. Static Model: Country Governance Indicators 
We included as explanatory variables the Kaufmann indexes for (i) rule of law 
and (ii) corruption by country for 1998. The key results were: 
 
•  The corruption index was never statistically significant in the fixed effect 
regressions at the 5% level or better, either as a separate variable or when 
interacted with the regulatory variables.  
                                                 
27 Including the first 2 principal components in a dynamic equation with a lagged dependent variable 
produced very similar results. 
28 Cubbin and Stern (2004), Table 7 and discussion for more details  
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•  The country rule of law index approached significance at the 5% level 
when interacted with the regulatory index and an age of regulator was also 
included as an explanatory variable. 
•  The Kaufman rule of law index was, however, highly significant in an 
OLS equation – and led to non-significance of the electricity regulatory 
variable. 
 
The last result (and the pattern of residuals) is a major reason why we believe 
that the estimated fixed effects capture most of the country-specific institutional 
differences. We also found: 
 
•  No statistically significant correlation between the fixed effects and the 
Kaufmann rule of law index; but 
•  A sizeable and statistically significant interaction term between our 
regulatory index and the Kaufmann rule of law index in a random effects 
specification (a coefficient of 0.07 with a t-value of 2.3). 
•  These results provide interesting pointers that the estimated fixed effects 
capture wider country-specific institutional quality issues but are clearly 
far from conclusive. We return to this issue in Section 5.2.4 below. 
 
5.2. Dynamic Models for Generation Capacity 
In this section we discuss the results  
 
a)  For a simple dynamic models for per capita generation capacity, adding a 
lagged dependent variable to the static, fixed effects model; and  
b)  For more sophisticated error correction models. 
 
Given the nature of the generation investment planning and construction 
process, we would expect quite long lags, which will be picked up from the simple 
formulation in (a). However, well-fitting simple LDV models may reflect spurious 
correlations rather than a systematic relationship so the more sophisticated models 
were estimated to test for spurious correlation as well as to improve our understanding 
of the dynamics and the lags, including the build-up of regulatory reputation effects  
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5.2.1. Simple Dynamic Models of Generation Capacity 
These models were estimated by adding a lagged dependent variable (LDV). 
The estimated coefficient on the LDV was very high – over 0.85 implying, as one 
would expect, a slow rate of adjustment of generation capacity – and with very high 
estimated t-values, over 60. 
The regression results are shown in Table 5 below. The key results are: 
 
•  The implicit long-run coefficient on the regulatory governance index was 
6.1 per unit on the index, implying a long-run effect of 24% on per capita 
generation capacity for a maximum score on the index as compared to 
17% in the static model. (However, the estimated coefficient was only 
significantly different from zero at the 10% level.) 
•  The implicit long-run effect in Equation 13 on per capita generation 
capacity from a regulatory agency (Ministry or autonomous) with at least 3 
years of existence is 26% as compared to 35% in the static model. The 
estimated coefficient was significantly different from zero at the 5% level. 
•  The elasticity of per capita generation capacity wrt. real GDP was very 




























     
Explanatory variables       
Lagged dependent variable  0.885 0.879
  (66.186) (66.094)
Real GDP per capita (log)  0.119 0.121
 (4.558) (4.610)




Regulator aged 1-3 years    0.010
  (0.893)













Adjusted R-squared  0.996 0.996
S.E. of regression  0.083 0.083
F-statistic 4366.527 4399.462
Durbin-Watson  1.850 1.834
No of observations  576 584
Note: t statistics in 
parentheses      
 
In all the main generation capacity equations reported above, the R
2 statistics 
are high – around 0.95 in the static fixed effects models and over 0.99 in the dynamic 
model. The latter in particular raises questions as to whether, given the fixed effects, 
the empirical results are dominated by the purely statistical relationship of one highly 
trended variable (per capita generation capacity) with another (real per capita GDP). 
In fact, neither of these series is dominated by an obvious trend
29 but the issue 




                                                 
29 See Data Annex in Cubbin and Stern (2004).  
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5.2.2. Error Correction Models and Lags  
 
5.2.2.1. Time Trends and Lags 
Our first test was to establish whether the coefficients on the regulatory 
governance variables remained positive and significant when we (a) included a time-
trend and (b) lagged the index by 3 years.  
The results were as follows: 
 
•  The time trend was statistically significant at the 1% level in a static 
formulation but negative and far from significant in an LDV model. Its 
estimated value in the static model was only 1.7% p.a. 
•  The estimated coefficient on the lagged regulatory index was positive in 
both models. In the LDV model, it was statistically significant at the 1% 
level and the magnitude of the estimated long-run coefficient was very 
similar to that in the LDV model without a time-trend. However, the 
magnitude of the estimated regulatory coefficient in the static model was 
about half the magnitude of that in Table 1, Equation 2 and only 
significant at the 10% level
30.  
 
(Note that lagging the regulatory variable by 3 years implies that all regulators 
established after 1997 are excluded from the sample.) 
 
5.2.2.2. Error Correction Models 
If we wish to be sure the fixed effects levels equations are not just spurious 
regressions, we can check to see whether there appears to be a plausible adjustment 
process. 
 
The levels equation is:  Yit = φi + βGit +  γRit + υit   (3) 
 
which can be estimated as:  Yit = fi + bGit + c Rit + uit   (4) 
where  Yit = log(electricity generation capacity per capita) 
Git = log(GDP per capita) 
                                                 
30 See Cubbin & Stern op cit, Table 9 for more details.  
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Rit is a regulatory governance variable; and  
fi is the fixed effect for country i 
 
From this, we can calculate the implied the steady state, equilibrium, or long term 
value, which can be written as:   
 
Y*it = φi + βGit +  γRit      ( 5 )  
 
We now postulate a partial adjustment error correction mechanism under which the 
actual value of capacity changes by a constant proportion of last year’s deviation from 
the long term value ie  
 
∆Yit = Yit-Yit-1 =  - λ (Yit-1 –Y*it-1)     (6) 
 
where (Yit-1 –Y*it-1) is last year’s deviation from equilibrium. 
 
If we wish to estimate (6), we can take the residuals uit from the levels equation in (4) 
and calculate the regression equation 
 
∆Yit = - λ uit-1 + eit       ( 7 )  
 
Alternatively, we could estimate  
 
  ∆Yit  =  - λ (Yit-1 – φi - βGit-1 -  γRit-1) + εit   (8a) 
  =   λφ - λYit-1 +λ βGit-1 +  λγRi-1t + εit   (8b) 
 
More specifically, since we are particularly interested in the size and significance of 
the regulatory variable, R, we can impose the estimate of β from the long term levels 
relationship (2) and estimate 
 
  ∆Yit  =  λφ – λ(Yit-1 - bGit-1 ) +  λγRit-1 + εit   (9a) 
 




  ∆Yit  =  λφ – λ(Yit-1 - 0.78 Git-1 ) +  λγRit-1 + eit   (9b) 
 
We have alternative estimates of λ from equations (7) and (9b). These can be 
compared. In addition, we have alternative estimates of γ: firstly, from the levels 
equation (4); and, secondly, the differences equation 7(b) from which we can calculate 
the implied value of γ as λγ/λ from the estimated coefficients.  
We tested for stationarity using the Pesharan-Shin W-statistic. Applying this 
test to the differenced equation 7(b), with the regulatory index as our measure of Rit, 
the test clearly rejects the presence of a unit root in the residuals with a t-statistic of –
8.05. Even in the corresponding levels equation, the Pesharan-Shin W-statistic does 
not appear to suggest non-stationarity in the residuals, implying that our generation 
capacity variable, GDP and our regulatory variables are co-integrated
31. This provides 
more confidence in the equations reported in Tables 4 and 5. 
The results are shown in Table 6 below. We report estimates for the levels 
equation (2), the partial adjustment equation (5) and the differenced model (9b). We 
report these (a) where the regulatory variable is the 4-element regulatory index and 
(b) where it is a dummy for all regulators over 3 years old. Equations estimated with 
alternative definitions of the regulatory variable yielded estimates with similar 






                                                 
31 Very similar results on the unit root test applied when we took alternative definitions of the 
regulatory variables: regulator over 3 years old and a quadratic in the age of the regulator.  
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Explanatory 
variables          
          
Real GDP 
per capita (log) 
0.7913    0.7846    




0.0490         




   0.0118      
 
 
   (3.230)      
Lagged 
Residuals from 1 
 0.1195     0.1188   
   (8.941)     (8.876)   
Error 
Correction Term 
   0.1181     0.1188 




aged over 3 years 
     0.2325    
       (5.673)    
Regulator 
aged over 3 years (t-
1) 
       0.0286 
          (2.000) 
 
Long-run Coefficient on 
Index (per unit) (λγ/λ) 
    0.099     
          
Long-run Coefficient on 
Regulator Aged over 3-years (λγ/λ) 
        0.244
 














         
Adjusted R-squared  0.955 0.156 0.159 0.955 0.150 0.149 
S.E. of regression  0.265 0.084 0.084 0.266 0.084 0.084 
F-statistic 448.7  4.676 4.784 450.3 4.676  4.51 
Durbin-Watson  0.165 1.79  1.80 0.168 1.78 1.78 
No of observations  608 582 582 610 583 583 
Note:  
 t statistics in parentheses     





The key results are: 
 
•  The derived estimate of the long-run effect on generation capacity of having a 
regulator (Ministry or autonomous) aged 3 years or more in the differenced 
equation of column 6 is 24%. This is very similar to that in the LDV model 
but lower than in the static model of Table 4 
•  The derived estimate of the long-run effect of a unit increase in the regulatory 
governance index in the differenced equation of column 3 is almost 1%, 
implying that the maximum score on the index is associated with almost 40% 
higher generation capacity than under a Ministry regulator with no electricity 
law. This is a lot higher than in the LDV model (26%) and also above the level 
in the static model (35%)
32.  
•  The estimates of λ are similar to each other – and very similar to the implied 
adjustment speed in the LDV model. A more sophisticated two-term error 
correction model showed slightly faster adjustment, particularly after 5 years. 
•  The estimated response to changes in GDP and regulatory governance is slow. 
Only 12% of the difference between actual and equilibrium long-run per 
capita capacity levels is made up in the first year. The estimated adjustment 
processes with both one and with two-term error correction factors are shown 
below. 
                                                 
32 Note that a simple multiplicative factor applied to a linear index is likely to exaggerate the maximum 












































These results provide strong support for the hypothesis that the regulatory 
governance impact on generation capacity in developing countries is positive and 
sizeable but takes time to build up. 
 
5.2.3.   Econometric Results for Models of Generating Capacity Utilisation and 
Technical Losses 
Table 7 presents some results relating to the impact of regulatory governance 
on efficiency. For the reasons set out in Section 3.1.2, we deliberately estimated 
simple models. Unfortunately, we were unable to find any reliable time-series data for 
our countries on commercial losses, or quality of service or productivity. 
The results were reasonably positive for capacity utilisation in generation but 
we never found any positive or significant effect of any regulatory variable for 


















     
Explanatory variables  17    18 
   
   
Real GDP per capita (log)  0.729   -0.841
 (2.279)   (-0.441)
Index of regulatory 
governance 0-4 
0.079  0.219
 (2.330)   (1.016)
AR(1) 0.713   0.648
 (23.365)   (17.786)
       
       
Estimation method 
FE + Prais 
–Winsten 
 FE  + 
Prais –Winsten 
      
Adjusted R-squared  0.743  0.840
S.E. of regression  0.449  2.697
F-statistic 56.196   92.624
Durbin-Watson  2.138  2.032
No of observations  574  472
Note:  
 t statistics in parentheses      
      
*Utilisation = generation/(capacityx24x365)     
 
The positive effect in the utilisation equation of the regulatory index 
(significantly different from zero at the 1% level) was found in some but not all other 
equations estimated.  
In the equation reported, a 1 point increase in the regulatory index is 
associated with a 0.8% increase in utilisation so that utilisation with the maximum 
index score of 4 implies a 3.2% increase relative to countries with an index score of 
zero. Utilisation rates also appear to be positively (and significantly) associated with 






5.2.4. Endogeneity and Causality in Generation Capacity Models 
 
5.2.4.1. Endogeneity 
Much of the literature on regulatory effectiveness expresses concerns over the 
endogeneity of: 
 
a)  countries choosing to have an independent/autonomous regulatory agency; 
and 
b)  the quality of governance of that agency
33. 
 
This discussion echoes similar debates about the endogeneity of independent 
central banks and how best to measure the impact of central bank independence eg on 
inflation and growth. The concern is essentially that countries with better 
(unobservable) governance have better functioning regulatory agencies eg because 
they have socio-economic characteristics that better support the rule of law, contracts 
and commercialisation. The problem is that it is very difficult to find good 
instruments ie instruments that are both correlated with the suspected endogenous 
variable and uncorrelated with the error term so that they can be treated as exogenous.  
However, Edwards and Waverman (2004) have adopted a novel approach to 
this using a rank-based instrument for their (12 element) EU telecom regulatory 
governance index. This approach, taken from Evans and Kessides (1993), provides a 
simple procedure, firstly, for the testing of whether or not there is evidence of 
endogeneity; and, secondly, for deriving an IV estimator to control for the estimation.  
The procedure is as follows. Firstly, we recalibrate our 4 element regulatory 
governance index, so that all countries where entries are 1 or 2 are reclassified as 1 
and all entries of 3 or 4 are reclassified as 2. Zeroes remain zero. We denote this as 
the Rank Index. We then estimate the following equation: 
 
 Index(Cubbin-Stern) = a0 + a1RankIndex it + uit     (10) 
 
We then include the estimated residuals from (10) in the following equation for per 
capita generation capacity: 
                                                 




Log(ELCAPPC)it = (a0 + ai) + a1 log(GDPPC)it + a2 ûit + vit (11) 
 
Whether or not a2 is significantly different from zero provides a test as to 
whether or not there is a potential endogeneity problem associated with our regulatory 
governance measure. Similarly, including the predicted values of the Cubbin-Stern 
index derived from (10) in our basic, fixed effects, static model provides an effective 
instrument to estimate the effect of any endogeneity bias in practice.  
As explained by Edwards and Waverman, the use of the Rank Index is, by 
construction, correlated with the original index but orthogonal to the error term 
provided that a small change in the original index would not change the position in 
the Rank Index. This can be expected to hold except for observations near the 
thresholds between the close to the boundaries between the Ranks. 
Adopting this procedure, we find that the coefficient on the residuals of (10) in 
the basic static equation for per capita generation capacity has a t-value of 1.7, 
implying that there is marginal evidence of endogeneity of the Cubbin-Stern 
regulatory index. However, instrumenting the Cubbin-Stern index by using its 
predicted value from (10) in place of the actual value produces virtually identical 
results – an estimated coefficient of 0.047 with a t-value of 4.3 in the instrumented 
case as opposed to an estimate of 0.049 and a t-value of 4.0 in the non-instrumented 
case. 
Like Edwards and Waverman (2004) and Gutierrez (2003), we find some 
weak evidence of endogeneity of regulatory governance quality but very little change 
in coefficient estimates from correcting for it.  The test in our case is not as strong as 
in Edwards and Waverman who have 12 rather than 4 initial governance levels. 
However, we can with some confidence reject the proposition that our results can be 




The question remains as to whether, looking forward, our regulatory 
governance coefficient estimates have any causal interpretation. However, the fact 
that our core results are maintained even with 3-year lags on the regulatory index and  
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also with sophisticated dynamic modelling suggests strongly that the results reflect an 
underlying causal relationship.  
Even if, they are not statistical artefacts arising from failures adequately to 
address dynamics or endogeneity, they may still be merely descriptions of a past set 
of events that cannot be applied to future electricity regulatory governance changes in 
sample countries let alone to the introduction or development of electricity regulation 
in non-sample developing countries
34.  
One reason why this question might be asked is that the regulatory literature 
derived from Levy and Spiller (1994) emphasises country-specific constitutional, 
legal, economic, and political differences as being crucial for the success or failure of 
utility regulation. Hence, a highly reduced form model that abstracts from all those 
issues may well fail to reflect these local issues that seem to be so important in 
practice. 
The answer to both these concerns lies in the importance of the country-
specific fixed effects. With 28 countries each having up to 21 years of data, we can 
obtain estimates of the fixed effects which should capture most if not all of the factors 
identified by Levy and Spiller and the subsequent literature. Hence, the estimated 
impact of eg enacting a regulatory law plus an autonomous regulator in Chile or 
Sudan (both countries in our sample) will be very different. That impact is the 
combination of (a) the predicted effect of the relevant regulatory variables plus (b) 
each country’s predicted fixed effect. The Chilean fixed effect is strongly positive 
relative to the sample average whereas that for Sudan is strongly negative. 
In other words, the coefficients that we report are ‘highest common factor’ 
estimates of the impact of regulatory governance indicators where the fixed effects 
not just control for but effectively “wash out” all the Levy and Spiller and similar 
factors. But, this means that the regulatory governance effects that we report are not 
just average cross-country sample effects but that they refer to a country with average 
scores on country-specific fixed effects. Moreover, they are the impacts that one might 
expect, looking forward, for a country: 
 
 
                                                 
34 For the reasons stated in Sections 2 and 3, we would not wish to claim that they are applicable to 
countries with an excess supply of generation capacity at any time during the period after 1980. This 
would exclude the Central and East European countries, the CIS and almost all OECD countries.  
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•  With an average country specific fixed effect 
•  Implementing an average quality law 
•  Establishing an average quality autonomous regulator, etc. 
 
It is for such a country that one might expect that implementing a best quality 
electricity regulator would increase per capita generation capacity in the long run by 
15-25%.  
The policy implication of this is, firstly, that the quality of overall country 
governance matters considerably for the impact of regulation on outcomes (eg as in 
the rule of law); and secondly, that countries cannot expect to achieve the gains we 
have estimated by enacting low quality regulatory laws or introducing autonomous 
regulatory agencies with very low staffing levels. But, the corollary is that the 
potential gains from introducing an electricity regulator could be significantly higher 
than the average level for countries with good overall governance who deliberately try 
to introduce best practice regulatory agencies and practices.  
The argument above follows not just from the logic of our fixed effect 
modelling but is supported by the suggestive implications of a potential interactive 
and/or independent impact of overall country governance (eg as measured by the 
Kaufmann index) on our regulatory governance measure. (See Section 5.1.2.2 above.) 
These arguments do not, of course, apply just to this paper. They also apply to 
the similar models of Gutierrez, Edwards and Waverman, etc. 
 
6. Discussion of Results and Concluding Comments 
 
6.1. Discussion of Results  
The results of this study seem to provide a broadly consistent picture that the 
existence of a regulatory agency with good governance characteristics not only can in 
principle improve regulatory outcomes but seems actually to do so in practice. For 
electricity supply industries in 28 developing countries in the 1980-2001 period, we 
find that an index of regulatory governance is a consistently positive and statistically 
determinant of per capita generation. Our results, using fixed effects estimation 
methods, are similar to those found in for telecoms in developing countries (e.g. 
Gutierrez, 2003).  
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The main positive findings are that, for developing countries:  
 
•  Averaging over developing country regulatory agencies, the estimated 
long-run impact on per capita generation capacity of a maximum 
regulatory governance index score of 4 is of the order of 15-25% cet par – 
and, in particular, after controlling for country-specific fixed effects. 
•  The estimated impact of regulation increases with experience – at least for 
the first 3-5 years or more. The cet par impact on per capita generation 
capacity of a regulator (autonomous and/or Ministry) established at least 3 
years is of the order of 25-35%. 
•  The effects on per generation capacity are robust not just to the inclusion 
of a lagged dependent variable but also to the inclusion of a time trend and 
3-year lags on the regulatory variables.  They are also robust to modelling 
via an error correction model and to IV modelling to allow for potential 
endogeneity biases. 
•  The effects of the enactment of (a) a regulatory law, (b) of having an 
autonomous regulator and (c) licence fee funding of the regulatory agency 
were each positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
•  There is some evidence, albeit weak, that better overall country regulatory 
governance is a statistically significant determinant of generation capacity 
utilisation (a good proxy for availability). 
•  There is some evidence, albeit weak, that the better the rule of law, the 
stronger the regulatory effect. 
 
There is reasonable evidence that superior regulatory governance improves generation 
utilisation rates. 
There are, however, some negative findings. These include the following 
 
•  There was no evidence of any significant, positive effect of any of our 
regulatory governance measures on transmission and distribution losses. 
•  There was no reliable evidence in this data set that competition or 
privatisation were significant determinants of generation capacity either 
individually or when interacted with regulatory governance. However, the  
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data set we used was much stronger on regulatory variables than on 
competition and privatisation variables. 
 
On the whole, we were surprised at the strength and robustness of the positive 
results. The data set we used has a number of major weaknesses in spite of being the 
best currently available. Among the main weaknesses of the data set are: 
 
•  The absence of any data on regulatory practice, including government 
(and/or electricity company) malpractice towards supposedly independent 
regulatory agencies (e.g. high within-term turnover rates of regulatory 
office heads/commissioners). 
•  The absence of any reliable cross-country data on ESI efficiency and 
productivity or on service quality and revenue collection 
•  The limited time dimension to the regulatory data – and the extremely 
limited time dimension to data on privatisation and competition. 
•  Potential omitted variable biases from the inability to test for the inclusion 
of many potentially significant variables. 
•  The limited and possibly unrepresentative sample of countries. 
 
It is to be hoped that some of the major data weaknesses can be remedied e.g. 
by systematic data collection exercises of the sort that have been carried out for 
telecom reform. 
 
5.2. Concluding Comments 
In this paper we have presented evidence which suggests that good regulatory 
governance does have a positive and statistically significant effect on some electricity 
industry outcomes in developing countries – notably per capita generation capacity 
levels - but we have not examined why this is so.  
To examine why and how regulation operates to improve outcomes is not a 
task that obviously recommends itself to econometric analysis. We suggest that, at 
least at this stage, it is better pursued by case studies with econometric work being 
concentrated on whether or not the results reported in this paper are confirmed in  
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subsequent analysis e.g. with superior data, particularly on regulatory practice, 
privatisation and competition variables. 
Nevertheless, we are confident that the results reported here are entirely 
consistent with the literature on the role of institutions in economic growth. The key 
point is that regulatory agencies with better governance are: 
 
•  Less likely to make mistakes 
•  More likely to correct mistakes speedily 
•  Less likely to repeat mistakes 
•  More likely to develop procedures and methodologies that involve 
participants and develop good practice. 
 
All of these reduce uncertainties for commercially operating companies – 
particularly private and foreign companies. This is especially important to sustain and 
encourage long-lived, sunk investments in highly capital-intensive industries at a 
reasonable cost of capital. As such, regulatory agencies, which have and maintain 
good governance, provide an effective underpinning for the operation of contracts as 
well as sound regulation of monopoly elements.  
The utility service industries like electricity supply may be considered as a 
microcosm for considering the role of institutions in sustaining investment, efficiency 
and growth. But, in fact, they are a touchstone. Given their role in supporting growth 
as well as their technical characteristics, electricity and similar industries are among 
those most in need of strong and effective regulatory frameworks. Hence, we suggest 
that our positive results on the role of good governance support and enhance the 
lessons of similar studies for independent central banks and telecom reform as well as 
supporting the general arguments of North, Rodrik and others on the role of effective 
and evolving institutions for sustained growth.  
It remains to be seen whether the results reported in this paper survive in the 
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